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The notion that commitment is valuable has long been a critical insight of non-
cooperative game theory, and has deeply aﬀected a number of social science ﬁelds,
including macroeconomics, international ﬁnance and industrial organization.1 Exist-
ing reputation literature argues that in dynamic relationships, reputation concerns
can substitute for a commitment technology. A patient long-run player who faces a
sequence of short-run players who believe their opponent might be committed to a
particular stage-game action beneﬁts from such a perception, as shown by [11, 12].
However, [6, 7] show that if the long-run player’s actions are imperfectly observed
by short-run players, reputation eﬀects eventually disappear almost surely, at every
equilibrium. This is particularly troubling since it shows that the original model
cannot explain survival of reputation eﬀects in environments where the agents have
a long history.2 On the other hand, the commitment possibilities of a central bank
or the managers of a ﬁrm may change over time, and market beliefs about the long
run player’s commitment possibilities are progressively renewed. So the question is
whether reputation eﬀects are maintained perpetually if reputations are sown in the
market only occasionally.
We model a long-run relationship as a repeated game between a long-run player
and an inﬁnite sequence of myopic opponents. The long-run player is either a normal
1A central bank may like to commit ex-ante to a policy (e.g., interest rate decisions, bailout
decisions) that may not be ex-post optimal or a ﬁrm may prefer to commit to a high-quality
technology that is costly in order to extract more money from its customers.
2The Bank of England has a history of centuries and the Federal Reserve has a history of almost
a century. Many ﬁrms, such as Ford, BP and Coca-Cola, have histories longer than half a century.
2type who takes actions optimally by considering the current and future consequences
of his actions, or a commitment type who is committed to using a particular stage-
game strategy in every interaction. The actions of the long-run player are imperfectly
observed. At the beginning of every period, there is a positive probability that the
long-run player is replaced by a new long-run player. The new player may also be
a normal type, or he may be a commitment type. Neither the replacements nor the
types of the long-run players are observed by the myopic players; hence, there is
perpetual uncertainty about the long-run player’s type. However, in the course of
the game the myopic players receive information regarding the type of their opponent
through informative signals they observe about the long-run player’s actions.
Our main result is a pair of lower bounds on the Nash equilibrium payoﬀs of a
normal type of long-run player as a function of the discount factor, the replacement
rate, and the commitment type probability. The ﬁrst bound is an ex-ante bound that
is calculated at the beginning of the game. The second bound is on the long-run
player’s equilibrium continuation payoﬀs at any positive probability history on the
equilibrium path.
If replacements are arbitrarily infrequent and the long-run player is arbitrarily
patient, our bound on the ex-ante payoﬀ converges to the same bound as that es-
tablished in [11, 12]. This shows that the introduction of infrequent replacements
constitutes a small departure from the benchmark model.
When continuation payoﬀs are considered, replacements play both a positive and
a negative role in the permanence of reputations. The negative eﬀect is twofold. First,
3reputations naturally degrade and the short-run player doubts at every stage that he
faces the same long-run player who played in previous stages. This makes reputation
building less valuable in the long-run. Second, the long-run player anticipates that
he might be replaced, and hence discounts the future more. In the extreme case
where replacements occur at every stage, the long-run player doesn’t care about
future interactions and hence no reputation can be built. The positive eﬀect is that,
even if the long-run player’s reputation is severely damaged at some point, renewed
doubt about his type in the mind of the short-run player oﬀers the opportunity to
rebuild a reputation.
We use our second bound to show that along a sequence of games with varying
discount factors and replacement rates, if the discount factor goes to 1 at a faster
rate than the rate at which the logarithm of the replacement rate goes to inﬁnity, 3
then the long-run player receives his highest possible commitment payoﬀ after every
equilibrium history of the repeated game. This shows that for a range of replacement
rates (as a function of the discount factor), player 1 beneﬁts from the positive eﬀect
of replacements without suﬀering signiﬁcantly from the negative eﬀects.
This result has a particularly natural interpretation in the study of frequently
repeated games. Increasing the discount factor is sometimes interpreted as increasing
the frequency with which a stage game is repeated.4 The conditions that our result
3This is a weak condition. It is satisﬁed, for instance, if the discount factor goes to one at a
speed which is any positive exponent of the replacement rate.
4For instance, [9] studies reputation games in which the time between the two stages of the
game get closer to zero. In his model the information structure of the stage game depends on the
time increment, whereas in our model the information structure is ﬁxed. The literature on repeated
games in continuous time, such as [10], is also motivated by interpreting the continuous-time game
as the limit of discrete-time games where the stage game is played very frequently.
4requires are satisﬁed if the replacement events follow a Poisson distribution in real
time with a constant hazard rate, and if the game is played in stages that become
arbitrarily more frequent.5 No matter how rarely or frequently replacements occur
in real time, they restore the persistency of reputation eﬀects in frequently repeated
games.
To derive our bounds, we calculate the expected discounted average of the one-
period prediction errors of the short-run players, where the expectation is taken
using the probability distribution function that is generated by conditioning on (i)
player 1’s type being the commitment type at the beginning, and (ii) his type not
changing. This idea is similar to the one introduced by [11, 12]. However, the active
supermartingale approach used in their work is not naturally adapted in our model
since the process that governs the beliefs of the short-run players has an extra drift
due to replacements.
In our model, the probability that player 1 is a particular commitment type at
every period is zero. In particular, there is no “grain of truth” in the fact that player
1 is of that particular commitment type at every stage. The “grain of truth” allows
one to apply merging techniques such as [3] to models in which players have initial
uncertainty about the behavior of other players, and to obtain the conclusion that
players eventually predict the behavior of other players accurately [see, for example
17, 13, 26]. It plays a central role in reputation models like those in [1] and [11, 12].
5If the period length between two periods, ∆, becomes small, then the eﬀective discount factor
between the two adjacent periods becomes very close to one (i.e., δ(∆) = e−r∆ for some r). If the
replacement events follow a Poisson distribution with a hazard rate ρ, then the probability of a
replacement event between two periods becomes almost ρ∆. As the period length ∆ vanishes, the
impatience rate (i.e., 1 − δ = 1 − e−r∆) vanishes at a rate proportional to ∆.
5We rely on an information theoretic tool called relative entropy [see 5, for an
excellent introduction to the topic] to measure signal-prediction errors of player 2
more precisely, thus generalizing the approach in [14]. This allows us to measure
the positive eﬀects versus negative eﬀects of replacements on reputation building. In
[15], relative entropy is used to conveniently derive merging results.
2 Review of the literature
Reputation models were ﬁrst introduced in the context of ﬁnitely repeated games
in [18] and [23]. In inﬁnitely repeated games, [11, 12] show that, under very weak
assumptions on the monitoring technology, in any Nash equilbrium an arbitrarily
patient long-run player obtains a payoﬀ that is at least as much as the payoﬀ he
could get by publicly committing to playing any of the commitment type strategies.
On the other hand, [6, 7] and [29] show that for a class of stage games, all reputation
eﬀects are temporary if the actions of the long-run player are imperfectly monitored.6
In the benchmark model in [11, 12], the long-run player’s type is ﬁxed once and
for all at the beginning of the repeated game.7 Our model is a variant in which the
types of the long-run player are impermanent.
Previous papers, such as [16, 4, 21, 24, 27, 28] have already shown that reputations
6In particular, they show that, for ﬁxed parameters of the game, there exists a period T such
that the long-run player’s equilibrium-continuation payoﬀ starting at T is close to some equilibrium
payoﬀ of the complete-information game, with probability close to one. Moreover, the equilibrium
play of the game after period T resembles some equilibrium of the complete-information repeated
game. Therefore, all reputation eﬀects (both payoﬀ and behavior eﬀects) eventually disappear.
7For an excellent presentation of reputation models, we refer the reader to part 4 of the book
[22].
6can be permanent if long-run types are impermanent. Most of these papers focus on
a particular equilibrium or a class of equilibria with interesting equilibrium dynamics.
Other interesting variations of the benchmark model which allow for permanent
reputation eﬀects include the study [19] of a model where short-run players must
pay a cost to observe past signals, the study [2] of reputation eﬀects in markets, the
analysis [20] of reputation dynamics when short-run players have bounded recall and
the study [8] of the sustainability of reputation eﬀects when the short run players
observe a summary statistic about the history of the play, as in online markets.
Our paper oﬀers a systematic analysis of reputation eﬀects in terms of payoﬀ
bounds in repeated games with replacements. In particular, we obtain explicit
bounds on equilibrium payoﬀs without making assumptions about the stage game or
the monitoring structure, for any value of the replacement rate and of the long-run
player’s discount factor. The long-run player does not need to know how good or
bad his reputation is.
3 Model
There is an inﬁnite sequence of long-run and short-run players. At every period t ∈ N,
a long-run player (player 1) plays a ﬁxed, ﬁnite stage game G with a short-run player
(player 2). The set of actions available to player i in G is Ai. Given any ﬁnite set
X, ∆(X) represents the set of probability distributions over X, so the set of mixed
stage-game strategies for player i is Si := ∆(Ai).
The set of types available to player 1 is Ω = {˜ ω} ∪ ˆ Ω. The type ˜ ω is called
7player 1’s normal type. The remaining types belong to ˆ Ω ⊆ S1 which is a ﬁnite
or countable set of simple commitment types. Each type ˆ ω ∈ ˆ Ω is committed to
playing the corresponding strategy ˆ ω ∈ S1 at each stage of the interaction. The
initial distribution over player 1’s types is µ ∈ ∆(Ω).
A short-run player lives only one period. The life span of each long-run player
is stochastic. The ﬁrst long-run player starts the game at time t = 1, and plays
the stage game against a new short-run player every period until he is replaced by a
new long-run player. Once a player is replaced, he does not re-enter the game. The
index it ∈ N indicates the identity of player 1 playing at stage t, and ωt is the type
of player 1 at stage t. The ﬁrst player 1 has identity i1 = 1. Between any two stages
t−1 and t, with probability ρ, player 1 is replaced (i.e., it = it−1 +1), in which case
a new type ωt is drawn according to µ and independent of the past play. With the
remaining probability 1 − ρ, player 1’s identity (and hence his type) continues from
stage t−1 to t, it = it−1, and ωt = ωt−1. There is thus a succession of players 1, and
when it is necessary to make a distinction between them, we refer to player (1,i) as
the i-th instance of player 1. Player (1,i)’s lifespan is the set of stages t such that
it = i.8
Actions in the stage game are imperfectly observed. Player i’s set of signals is a
ﬁnite set Zi. When an action proﬁle a = (a1,a2) ∈ A1 × A2 is chosen in the stage
game, the proﬁle of private signals z = (z1,z2) ∈ Z: = Z1×Z2 is drawn according to
8Another way to think of our model is to assume that there is a pool of inactive long-run players.
At every period only one player is active. The active player continues to play until he is replaced
by a new player from the pool. Once an active player is replaced, he never plays the game again.
8the distribution q( |a) ∈ ∆(Z). Each player i is privately informed of the component
zi of z. For α = (α1,α2) ∈ S1 × S2, we let q( |α) = Eα1,α2q( |a). Particular cases of
the model include public monitoring (where z1 = z2 almost surely for every a), and
perfect monitoring (where z1 = z2 = (a1,a2) with probability 1).
3.1 Histories and Strategies
The stage-game payoﬀ functions are u1 for player 1’s normal type, and u2 for player
2, where ui: A1 × A2 → R.
The set of private histories prior to stage t for player 1 is H1,t = (N×Ω×Z1)t−1,
with H1,1 = {∅}. Such a private history contains the identities of players 1, their
types and their signals9 up to stage t − 1. A generic element of this set is h1,t =
(i1,ω1,z1,1...,it−1,ωt−1,z1,t−1). In addition to h1,t, player 1’s behavior at stage t
is allowed to depend on his identity and type at stage t. A strategy for player 1
describes the behavior of all instances of player 1, i.e., it is a mapping
σ1: ∪t≥1 H1,t × N × Ω → S1
with the restriction that σ1(h1,t,it,ωt) = ωt whenever ωt ∈ ˆ Ω, since commitment
types are required to play the corresponding strategy in the stage game. The set of
all strategies for player 1 is denoted as Σ1.
The set of private histories prior to stage t for player 2 is H2,t = Z
t−1
2 , with
9We do not need to assume that histories reveal past actions, in particular, a player 1 could be
ignorant of the actions of past instances of player 1
9H2,1 = {∅}. A strategy for player 2 at stage t is
σ2,t: H2,t → S2.
We let Σ2,t be the set of all such strategies, and Σ2 :=
Q
t≥1 Σ2,t denotes the set of
all sequences of such strategies.
A history ht at stage t is an element of (N × Ω × Z1 × Z2)t−1 which describes all
signals observed by both players, as well as the types, and identities of player 1 up to
stage t. Since a history ht corresponds to a pair of private histories h1,t and h2,t for
players 1 and 2, respectively, we write ht = (h1,t,h2,t). Given two histories ht ∈ Ht
and ht′ ∈ H′
t, we let ht ht′ ∈ Ht+t′ be the history obtained by the concatenation of ht
and ht′, and we use similar notations for the concatenation of two private histories
of either player 1 or 2.
A strategy proﬁle σ = (σ1,σ2) ∈ Σ1 × Σ2 induces a probability distribution Pσ
over the set of inﬁnite histories (N × Ω × A1 × A2 × Z1 × Z2)∞. A player 1, when
evaluating the stream of future outcomes, cares only about the payoﬀs at the periods
when he is active. This is equivalent to assuming that an inactive player receives a
payoﬀ of zero. The intertemporal discount factor of player 1 is 0 < δ0 < 1. After
history h1,t with Pσ(h1,t) > 0, the expected discounted continuation payoﬀ from













10where 1it+τ=it−1 is the indicator function, which equals 1 when player 1’s identity
between stages t− 1 and t + τ − 1 remains the same. We have found, however, that
it is more convenient to express player 1’s payoﬀ using the probability distribution
that is conditional on his not being replaced. Let ˆ Pσ be the probability distribution
on future histories conditional on history h1,t ∈ H1,t and conditional on player 1’s
identity at stage t+τ−1 being the same as t−1 (i.e., it+τ−1 = it−1). This probability
distribution function is given by
ˆ Pσ[h1,t](hτ+1) = Pσ(ht hτ+1|h1,t,it+τ−1=it−1) =
Pσ(ht hτ+1,it+τ−1 = it−1|h1,t)
(1 − ρ)τ
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The normalized discounted continuation payoﬀ to player 1 at history h1,t is thus





We also let ˆ Pσ[ht] and ˆ Pσ[h2,t] be the probabilities over histories hτ following ht and
h2,t respectively, conditional on player 1 not being replaced between stages t−1 and
t + τ − 1. Similar expressions are used for the expected payoﬀs π1,σ[h2,t] following
h2,t ∈ H2,t.
113.2 Equilibrium
Nash equilibria are deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 1. A Nash equilibrium is a strategy proﬁle (σ1,σ2) ∈ Σ1 × Σ2 such that








Condition (1) requires that at any history h1,t, the strategy σ1 maximizes the
continuation payoﬀ of the player 1 who is active at that history. Nash equilibria
require that what σ1 prescribes for a player who becomes active at history h1,t is
optimal for that player. In a model without replacements, requiring σ1 to be optimal
at period zero is enough, but not in our model.
Condition (2) requires that every player 2 plays a myopic best-response to her
expectations of the opponent’s current-period play.
3.3 ε-entropy conﬁrming best responses
The relative entropy between two probability measures P and Q deﬁned over the
same ﬁnite set X is:










12with the convention that 0ln0 = 0. The relative entropy between P and Q is always
nonnegative, it is ﬁnite if and only if the support of Q contains that of P, and it
equals zero if and only if P = Q.
Assume that player 1’s strategy in the stage game is α1, and player 2 plays a best-
response α2 to her belief α′
1 about player 1’s strategy. Under (α1,α2), the distribution
of signals to player 2 is the marginal q2( |α1,α2) on Z2 of q( |α1,α2), while it is
q2( |α′
1,α2) under (α′
1,α2). Thus, player 2’s signal-prediction error, measured by the
relative entropy, is d(q2( |α1,α2) q2( |α′
1,α2)).
We say that α2 belongs to the set Bε(α1) of ε-entropy conﬁrming best responses to
α1 ∈ S1 whenever this prediction error is bounded by ε.10 More precisely, α2 ∈ Bε(α1)
when there exists α′
1 such that:
• α2 is a best response to α′
1
• d(q2( |α1,α2) q2( |α′
1,α2)) ≤ ε.
When player 1’s strategy is α1 and player 2 plays an ε-entropy conﬁrming best
response to it, the payoﬀ to player 1 is bounded below by the quantity vα1(ε) =
infα2∈Bε(α1) u1(α1,α2). We deﬁne the lower Stackelberg payoﬀ as v∗ = supα1 v∗
α1(0).
This is the smallest payoﬀ player 1 obtains when (i) he chooses α1, and (ii) player 2
plays a best response while accurately predicting the distribution of her own signals.
The supremum of all convex functions below vα1 is denoted as ˜ vα1.
10It is a consequence of Pinsker’s inequality (see [25], or Lemma 12.6.1 in [5]) that every ε-entropy
conﬁrming best response that is not weakly dominated is an
p
ε/2-conﬁrming best response in the
sense of [12].
134 Main Result
We deﬁne the inﬁmum over all Nash equilibria of all continuation payoﬀs of player 1
at any history of the repeated game that is on the equilibrium path, as follows:
v(µ,δ,ρ) = inf{π1,σ[h1] s.t. h1 ∈ ∪tH1,t,σ is a Nash equilibrium and Pσ(h1) > 0}.
We also consider the inﬁmum of all Nash equilibrium payoﬀs of player 1 at the start
of the game, following the initial history h1,1 = ∅.
v1(µ,δ,ρ) = inf{π1,σ[∅] s.t. σ is a Nash equilibrium}.
Clearly, v1(µ,δ,ρ) ≥ v(µ,δ,ρ). Our main Theorem below oﬀers bounds on both
ex-ante and continuation equilibrium payoﬀs to player 1 as a function of the distri-
bution of commitment types, the discount factor, and the replacement rate.
Theorem 1. For every value of the parameters µ(ˆ ω) > 0, δ < 1, and ρ < 1, it
follows that:
(Ex-Ante): v1(µ,δ,ρ) ≥ sup
ˆ ω∈ˆ Ω
˜ vˆ ω (−(1 − δ)lnµ(ˆ ω) − ln(1 − ρ)).
(Continuation payoﬀs): v(µ,δ,ρ) ≥ sup
ˆ ω∈ˆ Ω
˜ vˆ ω (−(1 − δ)lnρµ(ˆ ω) − ln(1 − ρ)).
In order to understand the meaning of the bounds of the theorem, it is worthwhile
considering their implications when player 1 is arbitrarily patient and replacements
are arbitrarily rare. In this case we obtain:
14Corollary 1. Along a sequence of games {G∞
n (µ,δn,ρn)}
∞
n=1, such that ρn → 0
and δn → 1,
1. liminfn v1(µ,δn,ρn) ≥ supˆ ω∈ˆ Ω ˜ vˆ ω(0).
2. If (1 − δn)lnρn → 0, then liminfn v(µ,δn,ρn) ≥ supˆ ω∈ˆ Ω ˜ vˆ ω(0).
3. If (1 − δn)lnρn → 0 and Ω is dense in S1, then liminfn v(µ,δn,ρn) ≥ v∗.
Part (1) of the corollary provides a robustness check for the results in [11, 12]
when replacements are allowed. If replacements occur infrequently and the long-run
player is suﬃciently patient, then all of player 1’s equilibrium payoﬀs are bounded
below by what can be obtained from his favorite commitment strategy, given that
player 2 accurately predicts her own signals.
Part (2) of the corollary says that if the replacements are infrequent, but they
disappear at a rate such that (1−δn)lnρn → 0, then the lower bound on equilibrium
payoﬀs conditional on any history of player 1 converges to the same lower bound
as the ex-ante payoﬀs.11 This result shows that if replacements are infrequent, but
not too infrequent compared to the discount rate, player 1 enjoys reputation beneﬁts
after any history of the game on the equilibrium path. Suﬃciently likely replacements
are needed to restore reputations after histories when those reputations have been
badly damaged, but overly frequent replacements damage reputation. Note that the
condition is rather weak because it is satisﬁed whenever ρn = (1 − δn)β, for some
β > 0. Thus, part (2) establishes the permanency of reputation eﬀects under fairly
11Note that since δn = δ0,n(1−ρn), it follows that (1−δn)lnρn → 0 if and only if (1−δ0,n)lnρn →
0.
15general conditions. This is in sharp contrast to the results in [6, 7] showing that all
reputation eﬀects eventually vanish if replacements never occur.
Part (3) of the corollary concludes that if the support of the type distribution is
suﬃciently rich, then continuation payoﬀs of player 1 are bounded below his lowest
Stackelberg payoﬀ across all Nash equilibria.
A natural economic environment in which the condition on the relative speed
of convergence rates assumed in (2) is satisﬁed is a repeated game played very fre-
quently. Consider a game played in periods t ∈ {1,2,...} where the time between
two adjacent periods is ∆ > 0. Suppose the long-run player is replaced according
to a Poisson probability distribution with parameter ρ over the real time, and his
instantaneous time preference is r > 0. Then his eﬀective discount factor between
two periods is δ(∆) = exp(−(r+ρ)∆) and the replacement probability at any period
is ρ∆. As the time ∆ between periods approaches zero, the replacement proba-
bility ρ∆ approaches zero, the discount factor δ(∆) approaches one, and therefore
(1 − δ(∆))lnρ∆ approaches zero. Therefore part (2) of the corollary applies.
Example. To illustrate the bounds from our main result, we consider a perfect mon-
itoring version of the quality game. Player 1 chooses to produce a good of high (H) or
low (L) quality, and player 2 decides whether to buy the good (b) or not (n). Payoﬀs





We identify player 1’s strategies with the probability they assign to H, and con-
sider a commitment type ˆ ω > 1
2 such that µ(ˆ ω) > 0. Let d∗ = d(ˆ ω 1
2) = ln2 +
ˆ ω ln(ˆ ω) + (1 − ˆ ω)ln(1 − ˆ ω) > 0. There is a unique best-response to any strategy α′
1
of player 1 if α′
1 > 1
2 and this best response is b. Therefore, Bˆ ω(d) = {b} for every
d < d∗. We have vˆ ω(0) = 3 − 2ˆ ω, and for every d,











(1 − δ)lnµ(ˆ ω) + ln(1 − ρ)
d∗
￿




(1 − δ)lnρµ(ˆ ω) + ln(1 − ρ)
d∗
￿
(3 − 2ˆ ω).
For a numerical application, suppose that the expected time between management
changes is 5 years, and the interest rate is 5% per annum. If the period length






260, and δ = δ0(1 − ρ) ≃ 0.9952. For the
commitment type ˆ ω = 1, d∗ = ln2 = 0.693. With µ(ˆ ω) = 0.01, we obtain the bounds
for ex-ante and continuation equilibrium payoﬀs of approximately 0.9624 and 0.9236,
respectively, which are comparable to the commitment payoﬀ of 1.
175 Proofs
The main idea of the proofs of both parts of Theorem 1 follow the classical argument
of [11, 12]. Assume that at every stage player 1 follows the strategy corresponding
to some commitment type ˆ ω. The sequence of players 2 should eventually predict
more and more accurately the distribution of signals induced by player 1’s actions;
hence, each player 2 plays a best-response to a strategy of player 1 which is “not
too far” from ˆ ω. This provides a lower bound on player 1’s payoﬀ while he plays ˆ ω
repeatedly, and hence on his equilibrium payoﬀ.
What makes matters more complicated in our model than in the models of [11,
12]’s original papers is the replacement process of player 1. If we assumed that
player 1 plays ˆ ω repeatedly, then the “learning” force according to which player 2
anticipates that the distribution of signals becomes “close” to one induced by ˆ ω is
countered by the possibility that player 1 is replaced, which acts as a “drift” in player
2’s belief toward the initial distribution. The way in which these eﬀects balance each
other needs to be carefully measured.
We measure prediction errors using the relative entropy distance as in [14], rather
than the L2 norm as in [11, 12]. The fundamental property of relative entropies on
which we rely, called the Chain Rule, allows for precise control over the process of
player 2’s errors in her own signals, assuming that player 1 plays ˆ ω. This property
is explained in Subsection 5.1 just below.
The proofs of both parts of our theorem follow similar arguments. The proof
of the ex-ante part of our main Theorem in Subsection 5.2 is simpler in notation;
18therefore, we present it ﬁrst and then present the proof of the continuation payoﬀs
part in Subsection 5.3.
5.1 Chain Rule for relative entropies
Consider two abstract sets of signals X and Y , and an agent observing ﬁrst x ∈ X,
then y ∈ Y . The distribution of (x,y) is P, while this agent’s belief on (x,y) is
Q. Decompose the observation of the pair (x,y) in stages. In the ﬁrst stage, the
agent’s error in predicting x ∈ X is d(PX QX), where PX and QX are P and Q’s
marginals on X, respectively. Once x ∈ X is observed, the prediction error in
y ∈ Y is d(PY( |x) QY( |x)), where PY ( |x) and QY ( |x) are P and Q’s conditional
probabilities on Y , respectively, given x. Hence, the expected error in predicting y
is EPXd(PY( |x) QY ( |x)), and the total expected error in predicting x, and then y,
is d(PX QX) + EPXd(PY( |x) QY ( |x)).
The Chain Rule of relative entropies [see, e.g., 5, Theorem2.5.3] shows that pre-
diction errors can be counted either globally, or in stages, with the same results, as
stated here:
d(P Q) = d(PX QX) + EPXd(PY ( |x) QY( |x)).
A useful implication of the Chain Rule is the following bound on the relative
entropy between two distributions under some “grain of truth” assumption (see [14]
for the proof).
19Claim 1. Assume Q = εP + (1 − ε)P ′ for some ε > 0 and P ′; then:
d(P Q) ≤ −lnε.
Consider player 1 who repeatedly plays ˆ ω, either from the start of the game
or after some history. We want to bound the total prediction error of player 2 in
her own signals, over a sequence of n stages. Since player 1 is actually of type ˆ ω
over these n stages with positive probability, there is some “grain of truth” in the
possibility that player 2’s process of signals is induced by player 1‘s playing ˆ ω at each
of these stages. Hence, we can apply Claim 1 in order to obtain a bound on player
2’s signal-prediction errors. The Chain Rule allows us to decompose this total error
as the sum of the expected errors at each stage, and hence to control for “how far”
player 2 is on average from predicting accurately the distribution of her own signals.
These arguments are presented in more detail in the next subsection.
5.2 Proof of the ex-ante part
The main idea of the proof is the following. We aim to bound player 1’s δ-discounted
expected payoﬀ, assuming that this player plays a commitment strategy ˆ ω. Player
2 may not be best responding to ˆ ω if she is anticipating a diﬀerent behavior from
player 1. Thus, a way of bounding player 1’s payoﬀ is to bound the δ-discounted
expected sum of player 2’s prediction errors about signals that are one stage ahead
(see Proposition 3 below).
To achieve this end, we use Claim 1 and the Chain Rule in order to derive
20a bound on the expected arithmetic average of the prediction errors of player 2
over n periods, using the probability distribution function generated by the strategy
ˆ ω and by conditioning on the event that no replacement has occurred during the n-
stages (see Proposition 1). In Proposition 2, we convert these bounds on the n-stage
prediction errors into a bound on the discounted sum of prediction errors about the
signals that are one stage ahead.
Fix ˆ ω ∈ ˆ Ω. Let σ′
1,ˆ ω be the modiﬁcation of a strategy σ1 in which the ﬁrst
instance of player 1, if he is the normal type, plays ˆ ω at every stage of the interaction:
σ′
1,ω(h1,t,it,ωt) = ˆ ω if it = 1, ωt = ˜ ω; and otherwise σ′
1,ω(h1,t,it,ωt) = σ1(h1,t,it,ωt).
Let σ′ = (σ′
1,ω,σ2).
For n ≥ 1, consider the marginal P 2,n
σ of Pσ over H2,n+1 and the probability
distribution ˆ P
2,n
σ′ over H2,n+1, given by
ˆ P
2,n
σ′ (h2,n+1) = Pσ′(h2,n+1|in = 1,ω1 = ˜ ω).
ˆ P
2,n
σ′ is the relevant probability distribution over the n stage ahead play when player
1 of type ˜ ω considers playing ˆ ω from the ﬁrst stage on, conditional on his not being
replaced.





σ ) ≤ −ln(µ(ˆ ω)) − nln(1 − ρ).
Proof. Deﬁne A as the event: “ω1 = ˆ ω, in = 1”. By the deﬁnitions of P 2,n
σ and ˆ P
2,n
σ′ ,
21we have P 2,n
σ ( |A) = ˆ P
2,n
σ′ ( ); hence,
P
2,n













σ (A) ˆ P
2,n












σ ) ≤ −ln(P
2,n
σ (A))
≤ −ln(µ(ˆ ω)(1 − ρ)
n).
Proposition 1 decomposes the prediction error of player 2 into the sum of two
terms. The ﬁrst term corresponds to the error made by player 2 in not assuming that
player 1 is of the commitment type. This error increases and goes to inﬁnity as µ(ˆ ω)
decreases and goes to zero. This corresponds to the intuition that reputations are
harder to build for commitment types that have low probability. The second term
is a measure of the error made in assuming that player 1 could have been replaced
between stage 1 and n, when in fact he wasn’t. This second term is linear in n,
and the slope goes to 0 when the replacement rate vanishes. This second term comes
from the “negative eﬀect” of the replacements in reputation building. This is because
player 2 is less likely to learn that player 1 plays the commitment type strategy if
replacements are more likely.





σ(h2,t) with player 2’s belief had player 2 assumed that player 1 was
of type ˆ ω, given by q2(ˆ ω,σ2(h2,t)).
The expected discounted-average relative entropy between the predictions of
player 2 over her next signal, when she relies either on Pσ or on player 1 being
of type ˆ ω, is:
d
σ,ˆ ω









Proposition 2. For every ˆ ω,
d
σ,ˆ ω
δ ≤ −(1 − δ)lnµ(ˆ ω) − ln(1 − ρ).

























Applying this identity to the sequence xt = E ˆ P 2
σ′d(p2
σ(h2,t)||q2(ˆ ω,σ2(h2,t)), we obtain:
23d
σ,ˆ ω















n−1 (−lnµ(ˆ ω) − nln(1 − ρ))
= −(1 − δ)lnµ(ˆ ω) − ln(1 − ρ),
where the inequality comes from Proposition 1.
Proposition 2 bounds the expected discounted error in player 2’s next stage sig-
nals. This expected error is the sum of two terms, which correspond to the two
terms discussed in Proposition 1. When δ → 1, the ﬁrst term, which corresponds to
player 2’s initial error as a result of not knowing that player 1 is of the commitment
type ˆ ω, vanishes, since the average prediction errors are taken over longer and longer
histories. The second term, corresponding to the drift in player 2’s beliefs that comes
from replacements, is now constant in the discount rate since no matter how long a
horizon is considered, the per-stage error remains the same.
Proposition 3. The expected payoﬀ to player (1,1) of type ˜ ω playing σ′
1,ˆ ω is at least:
˜ vˆ ω (−(1 − δ)lnµ(ˆ ω) − ln(1 − ρ)).
Proof. Conditional on history h2,t, player 1’s expected payoﬀ at stage t is bounded
24below by vˆ ω (d(p2
σ(h2,t)||q2(ˆ ω,σ2(h2,t)))). Using the convexity of ˜ vˆ ω, we obtain:







































= ˜ vˆ ω(d
σ,ˆ ω
δ )
≥ ˜ vˆ ω (−(1 − δ)lnµ(ˆ ω) − ln(1 − ρ)),
where the last inequality comes from Proposition 2 and from the fact that ˜ vˆ ω is a
nonincreasing function.
This proves the ex-ante part of our main Theorem.
5.3 Proof of the continuation payoﬀs part
Fix a Nash equilibrium σ, a history h1,t for player 1 such that Pσ(h1,t) > 0, and
ˆ ω ∈ ˆ Ω. Let σ′
1 be the strategy of player 1 that plays ˆ ω at all histories after h1,t
as long as player 1’s identity is the same as at history h1,t; at all other histories σ′
1
plays σ1. Let σ′ = (σ′
1,σ2), and, for h2,t such that Pσ(h1,t,h2,t) > 0, consider the
probabilities P 2,n
σ [h2,t] and ˆ P
2,n
σ′ [h1,t,h2,t] given by
P
2,n




σ′ [h1,t,h2,t](h2,n+1) = Pσ′(h2,t h2,n+1|h1,t,h2,t,it+n−1 = it−1).
P 2,n
σ [h2,t] is the probability induced over the signals of player 2 for the n stages
following h2,t when σ is followed, while ˆ P
2,n
σ′ [h1,t,h2,t] is the probability over player
2’s signals following (h1,t,h2,t), assuming that player 1 switches to ˆ ω after h1,t, and
conditional on player 1 surviving during these n stages.





σ [h2,t]) ≤ −ln(ρµ(ˆ ω)) − nln(1 − ρ).
Proof. Deﬁne A as the event: “player 1 is of commitment type ˆ ω in stage t − 1
(ωt = ˆ ω), and is not replaced from stage t to t + n (it+n−1 = it−1).” We have:
P
2,n













σ [h2,t](A) ˆ P
2,n












σ [h2,t]) ≤ −ln(P
2,n
σ [h2,t](A))
≤ −ln(ρµ(ˆ ω)(1 − ρ)
n).
The expected discounted-average relative entropy between the predictions of
26player 2 over her next signal when she relies either on Pσ or on player 1 being
of type ˆ ω after history h1,t,h2,t, is:
d
σ,ˆ ω




τ−1E ˆ P 2
σ′d(p
2
σ(h2,t   h2,τ)||q
2(ˆ ω,σ2( h2,τ))).
Proposition 5. For every h2,t with Pσ(h1,t,h2,t) > 0,
d
σ,ˆ ω
δ [h1,t,h2,t] ≤ −(1 − δ)ln(ρµ(ˆ ω)) − ln(1 − ρ).
Proof. The proof relies on Proposition 4 and follows steps identical to those of the
proof of Proposition 2.
It is interesting to compare Proposition 5, which applies to continuation equilib-
rium payoﬀs, with Proposition 2 for the ex-ante equilibrium payoﬀs. In both cases,
the second term, which corresponds to the negative eﬀects of replacements on repu-
tations, is the same. This is due to the fact that this term arises from the uncertainty
on replacements of player 1, which is the same in both cases. The ﬁrst term is linear
in δ in both cases; it depends on ρ in Proposition 5, while it is independent of ρ
in Proposition 2. In the bound for continuation payoﬀs (Proposition 5), this ﬁrst
term corresponds to the positive eﬀect of replacements in reputations. If there are
no replacements, as in [11, 12], there may be histories after which player 2 knows
for sure that player 1 is of the normal type, after which it is impossible to restore a
reputation. On the other hand, replacements cast a permanent doubt in player 2’s
mind as to whether player 1 is of the commitment type, which may allow reputation
eﬀects to be restored after any history. The higher the replacement rate is, the easier
27it is to restart a reputation, and the lower this ﬁrst term is.
Proposition 6. The expected continuation payoﬀ after history h1,t to player 1 of
type ˜ ω playing σ′
1 is at least
˜ vˆ ω (−(1 − δ)lnρµ(ˆ ω) − ln(1 − ρ)).
Proof. This follows from Proposition 5, when the same sketch is used as in the proof
of Proposition 3.
This proves the continuation payoﬀs part of the main Theorem.
6 Concluding comments
Although the idea that impermanent types may restore reputation eﬀects perma-
nently is not entirely new, our paper is the ﬁrst to show that this is true without
imposing any assumptions on the stage game or without restricting the class of equi-
librium strategies. Our main Theorem provides bounds on the equilibrium payoﬀs
of the long-run player that hold uniformly after any history on the equilibrium path.
We now brieﬂy discuss upper bounds on equilibrium payoﬀs, continuation payoﬀs
after histories outside of the equilibrium path, and several extensions.
6.1 Upper bounds
Theorem 1 provides lower bounds on equilibrium payoﬀs. The techniques developed
in this paper allow us to derive upper bounds as well.
28The supremum over all Nash equilibria of all continuation payoﬀs of player 1 at
any history of the repeated game that is on the equilibrium path is:
V (µ,δ,ρ) = sup{π1,σ[h1] s.t. h1 ∈ ∪tH1,t,σ is a Nash equilibrium and Pσ(h1) > 0},
and the supremum of all Nash equilibrium payoﬀs of player 1 at the start of the game
is:
V1(µ,δ,ρ) = sup{π1,σ[∅] s.t. σ is a Nash equilibrium}.
The maximum payoﬀ to player 1 if player 2 plays an ε-entropy conﬁrming best
response to player 1’s strategy is:
V (ε) = max{u1(α1,α2),α1 ∈ S1,α2 ∈ Bα1(ε)},
and we let ˜ V represent the inﬁmum of all concave functions above V .
The following result can be proven along lines similar to the proof of Theorem 1:
Theorem 2. For every value of the parameters µ(˜ ω) > 0, δ < 1, ρ < 1:
(Ex-Ante): V1(µ,δ,ρ) ≤ ˜ V (−(1 − δ)lnµ(˜ ω) − ln(1 − ρ));
(Continuation payoﬀs): V (µ,δ,ρ) ≤ ˜ V (−(1 − δ)lnρµ(˜ ω) − ln(1 − ρ)).
When ρ → 0, δ → 1, and (1 − δ)lnρ → 0 (which is the case, for example,
when the game is played in time increments that approach to zero), the bound on
continuation equilibrium payoﬀs converges to ˜ V (0), which coincides with the upper
29Stackelberg payoﬀ v∗ = max{u1(α1,α2),α1 ∈ S1,α2 ∈ Bα1(0)}.
As in [12] when commitment types have full support and monitoring allows for
identiﬁcation of player 1’s actions, the upper Stackelberg payoﬀ coincides with the
Stackelberg payoﬀ v∗. For this class of games, when the frequency of play increases,
both the lower and upper bounds on all continuation equilibrium payoﬀs to player 1
on the equilibrium path converge to the same limit.
6.2 Equilibrium payoﬀs outside of equilibrium path
The continuation payoﬀ bounds of Theorems 1 and 2 hold on the equilibrium path.
However, these results do not address what happens outside the equilibrium path,
since the Nash equilibrium notion puts no restrictions on players’ behavior after
such histories. However, tight bounds still obtain uniformly after all histories if one
considers appropriate reﬁnements of Nash equilibria.
The reﬁnement that is needed is that, after every private history h2,t, player 2
holds a belief on player 1’s types, and that these beliefs are updated using Bayes’s
rule whenever possible. Moreover, player 2 plays a best-response to her belief on
player 1’s types and each type’s strategy. These requirements are stronger than a
weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium, but weaker than a sequential equilibrium. When
we restrict attention to such equilibria, the continuation payoﬀ bounds of Theorems
1 and 2 hold after every history, whether on the equilibrium path or not.
306.3 Extensions
Although our model speciﬁes the replacement process, it is fairly straightforward to
extend our main result to the following extensions of our model.
Nonstationary replacements: Our model makes the simplifying assumption that
the replacement rate is ﬁxed through time. Our approach easily generalizes to the
case in which the replacement rate is time-dependent, and players may have in-
complete information about it. The extension of our result to this context needs
the assumption of a lower bound and an upper bound on replacement rates after
any history. Such an extension can be interesting to study in games where periods
of institutional stability where replacements are less likely follow periods of higher
instability where they are more likely.
Nonidentically, independently distributed replacements: Similarly, our techniques
easily extend to the study of cases in which the replacement process may depend
on the current type of the long-run players and may be nonstationary. The only
condition needed in such a context for our result to generalize is a uniform lower
bound on the probability of a considered commitment type, given any past history.
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